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 Abstract 
There is considerable confusion surrounding the notion of consciousness. This confusion can 
be partially resolved by clarifying the referents of the word Aconsciousness.@ Doing so, however, 
reveals a more insidious problem, namely, the role played by personal beliefs in understanding 
consciousness. In particular, as revealed by a comprehensive survey, such beliefs range along a 
material-transcendent dimension, with the choice of notions of consciousness corresponding to 
materialist, conservatively transcendent, or extraordinarily transcendent positions. Further empirical 
research has revealed that those with more transcendent beliefs tend to have a more rational and 
curious approach to the world than those with more materialist beliefs. And, indeed, transcendent 
beliefs are also associated with greater intelligence. Although the possibility of a developmental 
sequence from materialist to transcendent beliefs is suggested, given the nature of fundamental 
beliefs, it does not appear that reconciliation between them is possible. Thus, although the confusion 
surrounding the study of consciousness can be clarified, the situation giving rise to the confusion 
cannot be eliminated. 
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I think that many researchers probably get confused when they first encounter the discussion 
of consciousness in the scientific and philosophical literature. There is such a variety of contradictory 
notions about consciousness that it is not clear at first sight what to make of them. Or at least, that 
was my experience 25 years ago when I began to formally study consciousness. It seemed to me at 
the time that the first order of business was to sort out the confusion. In retrospect, this turned out to 
be fairly straightforward to do. However, the causes of the confusion, because of their dependence on 
personal and social variables, could not be removed and so, although the confusion can be clarified, 
it cannot be eliminated. 
 Defining Consciousness 
On a superficial level, confusion arises from failure to clearly specify the referents of the 
word Aconsciousness,@ or to agree upon their use. At the time I began this research, the most 
comprehensive analysis of the use of the word Aconsciousness@ had been carried out by Thomas 
Natsoulas (1978) by examining the definitions of consciousness in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
Analysing his definitions along with those of others, a total of 29 definitions, led to the identification 
of four main categories of meanings that I designated as consciousness1, behavioural consciousness2, 
subjective consciousness2, and consciousness3 (Barušs, 1987). 
One of the things that researchers want to talk about when they use the word Aconsciousness@ 
is to refer to the capacity of an organism or machine to discriminate environmental stimuli and to act 
on it in a minimally goal-directed manner. That would be consciousness1. Different researchers set 
different thresholds for how much of this needs to be going on for the definition to apply. For 
example, Karl Pribram (1976) applied a Acuddleness criterion@ so that only furry animals that were 
up and about could be regarded as being conscious. However, it makes sense to simply regard 
consciousness1 as a variable with flexible gradations applicable to a researcher=s own interests. 
It is important to notice that consciousness1 is a definition of consciousness Afrom the 
outside.@ That is to say, the criteria for the presence of consciousness can be determined through 
objective observation of the organism or machine in question. But we also use the word 
Aconsciousness@ for phenomena that are inherently subjective, for which a definition can only be 
applied Afrom the inside.@ Thus, sometimes we use the word Aconsciousness@ to refer to the 
experiential events characterized by intentionality that apparently go on subjectively for a person. 
(The word Aintentionality@ here has the meaning of Aaboutness@as a characteristic of mental states 
rather than Aintention@ as a disposition toward actions.) This would be the meaning of Asubjective 
consciousness2.@ 
In order to make them accessible to objective scientific scrutiny, subjective phenomena often 
get defined operationally in objective terms. In this case, the trick is to find a good behavioural 
characterization of subjective consciousness2. And this usually hinges on self-reference. Thus, 
Abehavioural consciousness2@ is the behavioural demonstration of an organism=s (or machine=s) 
explicit knowledge of its situation, such as, for example, the ability to give a verbal description of its 
own mental states. And this is essentially consciousness1 applied to itself, (cf. MacKay, 1966) or 
simply the notion of metacognition more generally. 
Logically, the behavioural version of consciousness2 is a desiccated residue of its subjective 
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counterpart. However, this has not stopped some researchers from invoking the Turing test to argue 
that the demonstration of behavioural consciousness2 implies the existence of subjective 
consciousness2, so that, for example, a machine whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a 
normally functioning person should be regarded as having real subjective states (e.g., Lycan, 1987). 
For such researchers, an equivalence is established between the subjective and behavioural 
definitions of consciousness2. 
The fourth common meaning of consciousness, namely consciousness3, refers to the sense of 
being that a person can have subjectively for herself. As is the case for most of us, I think, I feel that 
existence goes on. Although some researchers have argued that this is none other than an application 
of subjective consciousness2 to itself, (e.g., Natsoulas, 1986), others have resisted the identification 
of this notion of consciousness with intentional mental states (e.g., Helminiak, 1984). While it is true 
that, upon explicit identification of consciousness3 within the flux of ongoing experiential events, it 
has the features of qualia and requires consciousness2 to explain, there are also apparently altered 
states of consciousness in which there are no intentional contents but in which the sense of existence 
remains (cf. Forman, 1990) so that we should not be too quick to simply collapse consciousness3 into 
subjective consciousness2. 
There is one other observation to be made about these definitions of consciousness, namely, 
that they often carry a volitional connotation in addition to a perceptual one. In other words, 
consciousness is not just equated with awareness, but usually includes the notion of agency. This is 
contained explicitly in the definition of consciousness1 but is entailed even in consciousness3 in that 
consciousness3 has sometimes been associated with the notion of a self endowed with will (cf. 
Assagioli, 1965; 1973/1974). For the purposes of this analysis it is not important whether there is any 
Areal@ agency or not, but that notions of consciousness usually include a volitional aspect. 
These were the categories for the referents of consciousness that I found, and I have not seen 
any definitions since that time that would not fit this scheme. Thus, it is not difficult to see what it is 
that we are talking about when we discuss consciousness. 
I should point out, however, that sometimes all effort at definition is ignored and the concept 
of consciousness simply functions as a Rorschach blot upon which researchers project their favourite 
ideas about the nature of reality. That is the case, for example, in the book The Concept of 
Consciousness (Klein, 1984) in which the reader is never even given a definition of consciousness. 
But this leads us to the next layer of the confusion C untangling the personal from the professional. 
 
 Notions of Consciousness vs. Beliefs about Reality 
Even when they were not blatantly projecting their own version of reality onto the concept of 
consciousness, the way researchers would talk about it appeared to vary with personal factors rather 
than rational evaluation of empirical data or logical philosophical argumentation. And the most 
salient personal factor appeared to be a researcher=s personal beliefs about the fundamental nature of 
reality. More specifically, a researcher=s beliefs appeared to range from materialist to 
transcendentalist versions of reality. And these beliefs appeared to carry with them her notions of 
consciousness. 
This observation from the literature is easy enough to check empirically and Robert Moore 
and I did so by developing a questionnaire through preliminary, pilot, and survey stages, and 
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administering it widely in 1986 to academics and professionals who could potentially write about 
consciousness in the academic literature (Barušs, 1990). In fact, 66 of the total 1491 copies circulated 
were actually mailed to those with a particular interest in consciousness, such as authors of scientific 
books or papers about consciousness. We received 334 completed questionnaires and used numerous 
multivariate statistical procedures in order to analyse the results. Among those procedures were 
cluster and factor analyses, which allowed psychological constructs to naturally emerge from the 
data. 
What we found was that there is a strong material-transcendent dimension among academics 
and professionals who could potentially write about consciousness in the academic literature and that 
notions of consciousness are intimately tied to beliefs about reality. Furthermore, we identified three 
main positions along this dimension which we designated the materialist, conservatively 
transcendent, and extraordinarily transcendent positions. The main features of these positions are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 Table 1 
 Correlations of Beliefs About Reality With Various Variables 
 
 
Variables 
 
Beliefs About Reality 
 
Materialism 
 
Conservative 
Transcendence 
 
Extraordinary 
Transcendence 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Physicalism 
 
Determinism 
 
 
Religiosity 
 
Meaning 
 
Extraordinary 
Experiences 
Extraordinary 
Beliefs 
Inner Growth 
 
Mind-Body Problem 
 
Physical Monism 
 
Dualism 
 
Mental Monism 
 
Epistemology 
 
Science 
 
Hermeneutics 
 
Paranormal 
 
Religious Affiliation 
 
None 
 
Traditional 
 
Own Beliefs 
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Notions of 
Consciousness 
Information Subjective Altered States 
 
Emergent Property 
 
Evidence of Spirit 
 
Ultimate Reality 
 
Intentionality 
 
Gives Meaning 
 
 Key to Growth 
 
Significance of 
Consciousness 
 
Byproduct 
 
Important 
 
All There Is 
 
Table 1 Note: Based on 334 completed questionnaires using various multivariate analyses. Adapted 
from Barušs, 1990, page 129. 
 
The materialist position is characterized by a belief that the universe is ultimately a physical 
place governed by deterministic laws and that science is the proper way to learn about it. Those 
tending toward this position have no religious affiliation. Consciousness is seen to be an emergent 
byproduct of physical or computational processes, usually as just information, and is characterized by 
intentionality. Thus, the relevant definitions of consciousness would be consciousness1, behavioural 
consciousness2, and the more objective aspects of subjective consciousness2. 
Those tending toward the conservatively transcendent position are inclined to have traditional 
religious beliefs and to think that meaning is important. Indeed, it is by paying attention to that which 
is meaningful that we learn things. These people are metaphysical dualists. This is reflected in the 
notions of consciousness that they chose. Thus, consciousness gives meaning to reality and 
consciousness is evidence of a spiritual dimension within each person. Similarly, the definitions of 
consciousness that were endorsed were subjective consciousness2 and consciousness3. 
On the basis of what we had read in the literature, Moore and I had expected these two 
positions to emerge. What we had not anticipated was that an even more extreme transcendent 
position would cohere. We called it an Aextraordinarily transcendent@ perspective. Those who held 
this view claimed to have had extraordinary experiences such as mystical experiences or out-of-body 
experiences. They had extraordinary beliefs such as the belief that the physical world is an extension 
of the mental, that reincarnation occurs, and that we can know things through extraordinary means 
such as extrasensory perception and understanding that is superior to rational thought. Exploration of 
one=s inner experiential world is emphasized along with the need for self-transformation. When 
asked for their religious affiliation they checked off the AOwn Beliefs@ box. For them, consciousness 
is the ultimate reality from which everything else, including the physical world, emerges, but also, 
paradoxically, it is the key to self-development. Definitions of consciousness that were endorsed 
tended to be those that emphasized subjective and transcendent aspects; or perhaps more accurately, 
the notion of what consciousness is was shifted from the ordinary waking state to altered states of 
consciousness (Barušs, 1990; Barušs & Moore, 1989). 
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There are a couple of things to note about this scheme. The first is that notions of 
consciousness, not surprisingly, are inherently intertwined with beliefs about reality. Because of this 
we dropped the distinction between beliefs about reality and notions of consciousness and simply 
referred to them henceforth as Abeliefs about consciousness and reality.@ The second thing to note is 
that the significance of consciousness increases from materialist to transcendent positions so that, for 
materialists, consciousness is just a byproduct of physical processes. For those tending toward the 
conservatively transcendent position, consciousness is important. And for the extraordinarily 
transcendent, there is ultimately nothing else. 
 
 Personality Correlates of Beliefs about Consciousness and Reality 
Whenever a psychological construct is uncovered, it makes sense to check to see if it has any 
correlations with standard personality traits. One of my undergraduate thesis students, Sonya Jewkes, 
decided to look at them using the Jackson Personality Research Form E (Jackson, 1999) as a measure 
of personality along with a revised version of the original survey questionnaire (Barušs & Moore, 
1992) that had also been tested with undergraduate students (Barušs, 2000). 
In designing a study, the question arose whether closed-mindedness is related to the material-
transcendent dimension of beliefs about consciousness and reality. Moore and I had embedded a 
truncated measure of intolerance of ambiguity (cf. Kirton, 1981) in the original survey questionnaire. 
The only statistically significant result was that those scoring high on religiosity also scored high on 
rigidity (Barušs, 1990). However, this was a crude measure, and from reading the consciousness 
literature, it seemed that those who had had extraordinary experiences were more open-minded than 
others, so that it was possible that they could score higher on measures of Aopenness,@ such as the 
Understanding and Sentience scales of the personality measure. In particular, Understanding refers to 
a person=s interest in rationally understanding the world whereas Sentience is a measure of a person=s 
appreciation of sensory impressions (Jackson, 1999). Given the previous results, however, we 
expected that the correlations with openness would be lowest for religiosity. 
 Seventy-five students from my undergraduate courses participated in the study anonymously 
on a volunteer basis after having been told that their participation would have no bearing on their 
performance in the courses. The average age of the participants was 23 years, with 65% being 
female. The main statistically significant results are summarized in Table 2. In the table, the 
materialist position has been realigned as antimaterialism for convenience in interpreting the data, 
and consists of a single scale, Antiphysicalism (APH). The conservatively transcendent position is 
represented by two scales: Religiosity (REL) and Meaning (MEA). Extraordinary transcendence is 
made up of three scales: Extraordinary Experiences (EXE), Extraordinary Beliefs (EXB), and Inner 
Growth (ING). A global scale, consisting of all items from the beliefs questionnaire, is designated as 
ATOT.@ 
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Table 2 
Correlations Between Personality Scales 
and Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality Scales 
Personality Traits Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality 
NAME CHARACTER APH REL MEA EXE EXB ING TOT 
 
Achievement 
industrious 
aspiring 
competitive 
 
.28 
 
.24 
 
.23 
    
 
Defendence 
defensive 
secretive 
rationalizing 
   
-.24 
    
 
Dominance 
controlling 
forceful 
assertive 
  
-.23 
     
 
Endurance 
persistent 
determined 
steadfast 
 
.24 
 
.25 
  
.29 
 
.24 
  
.28 
 
Harmavoidance 
fearful 
pain-avoidant 
avoids risks 
    
-.37 
 
-.27 
 
-.29 
 
-.25 
 
Nurturance 
sympathetic 
caring 
maternal 
   
.23 
    
 
Order 
neat 
organized 
disciplined 
    
-.31 
 
-.38 
 
-.40 
 
-.33 
 
Sentience 
aesthetic 
sensuous 
open to experience 
 
.25 
 
.27 
  
.31 
  
.29 
 
.26 
 
Social Recognition 
approval seeking 
socially proper 
agreeable 
 
-.24 
    
-.24 
  
-.25 
 
Understanding 
curious 
logical 
astute 
 
.48 
 
.32 
 
.40 
 
.61 
 
.46 
 
.55 
 
.57 
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Table 2 Note: All correlations are significant at p < .05 using two-tailed tests. These data are based 
on 75 completed questionnaires. Adapted from Jewkes & Barušs, 2000, pages 101 and 102. 
“CHARACTER” refers to characteristics of high scorers on personality traits as given by 
Jackson, 1999, pages 5 to 7. 
 
We saw in the results what we had anticipated regarding openness. Indeed, even the 
correlations with Religiosity were numerically the lowest. However, what we had not anticipated was 
the strength of the correlations for the Understanding personality trait. In fact, Understanding 
accounts for one third of the variance in total belief scores. 
We wondered whether the results were somehow the result of the student participants trying 
to tell us what we wanted to hear. However, it is difficult to know how they could have anticipated 
what we might have wanted. There were no statistically significant correlations between the 
Desirability scale of the Jackson Personality Research Form (which is used to control for social 
desirability) and beliefs. Furthermore, those students scoring highest on transcendence were also 
those who cared least what others thought of them as indicated by the negative correlations with 
Social Recognition. Conversely, students who did care what others thought would have had to have 
tried to not only score in a materialist direction but also suppress displaying any actual intellectual 
curiosity that they might have had about the world. That seems like an unlikely explanation of the 
data. 
Also of note are the negative correlations between extraordinary transcendence and both 
Order and Harmavoidance. Those scoring high on the extraordinary transcendence scales were less 
likely to be well-organized or to be risk avoidant, suggesting a more laissez-faire approach to life. 
The Nurturance and Defendence correlations indicate that those for whom meaning is an important 
aspect of their fundamental beliefs were also likely to be more compassionate and less defensive than 
others. And, finally, Achievement, the effort to get ahead, and Endurance, the tendency to persist, 
were positively correlated with transcendence, while Dominance, the disposition to assert oneself, 
was negatively correlated with Religiosity (Jewkes & Barušs, 2000). 
 
 Intelligence Correlates of Beliefs about Consciousness and Reality 
This study raised an obvious question. Given that we found a correlation between 
understanding and transcendent beliefs, and given that, in general, there are small correlations 
between openness and intelligence (McCrae, 1993B94), are there, in fact, correlations between 
intelligence and transcendent beliefs? Another undergraduate thesis student, Nicole Lukey, decided 
to have a look at this question.  
There is a cognitive deficits hypothesis which states that those who think that unusual things 
can happen suffer from irrationality and a lack of critical judgment. Or, to put it bluntly, anyone who 
thinks that there is more to reality than the physical universe is just plain stupid. There is some 
support for this hypothesis (e.g., Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) but the hypothesis appears to apply more 
to superstitious behaviour, such as the belief that the number 13 is unlucky, rather than to 
transcendent beliefs as defined by Moore and myself. Previous, more relevant studies (e.g., Roe, 
1999), had found no differences in critical thinking between participants who believed that unusual 
phenomena were possible and those who did not. Lukey and I did not think that the cognitive deficits 
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hypothesis would be supported, but rather, that we could find some correlations between intelligence 
and transcendent beliefs. 
This time 39 students were recruited from the introductory psychology participant pool for 
the study. Their only interaction with the experimenter was for the purposes of the experiment and 
none of them had any interaction with me. The participants were administered the beliefs 
questionnaire, the Understanding scale from the Personality Research Form, and 6 of the 10 
subscales from Jackson=s Multidimensional Aptitude Battery-II (MAB-II; Jackson, 1998). Three of 
the subscales from the MAB-II can be added to get a Verbal IQ score, three to get a Performance IQ 
score, and both of those, in turn, can be combined to obtain the Full Scale IQ. 
All of the correlations between beliefs scales and IQ scales that were statistically significant 
at the p < .05 level were in the expected direction. These correlations are given in Table 3. It is 
important to remember that these results are based on a small sample size of undergraduate students 
and may have limited generalizability. 
 Table 3 
 Correlations of IQ with Beliefs Scales 
 
 
 
Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality 
 
 
Antiphysicalism 
 
 
Meaning 
 
Extraordinary 
Experiences 
 
 
Inner Growth 
 
 
 
IQ 
 
Vocabulary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.41 
 
Object Assembly 
 
.37 
 
.35 
 
 
 
 
 
Verbal 
 
 
 
.33 
 
.33 
 
 
 
Full Scale 
 
 
 
.33 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Note: All correlations are significant at p < .05 using two-tailed tests. These data are based on 
39 completed questionnaires. Adapted from Lukey & Barušs, 2005, page 265. 
 
In addition to the correlations with beliefs scales indicated in Table 3, there was a striking 
correlation of B.48 (p < .01) between one of the key items from the beliefs questionnaire and Full 
Scale IQ. The item reads: AThere is no reality other than the physical universe.@ In other words, there 
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was a strong correlation between intelligence and the belief that there is more to reality than the 
physical universe. Thus, our somewhat weak hypotheses were supported. 
We had assumed that the relationships between beliefs and intelligence would essentially be 
linear as given in the analyses cited thus far. Visual inspection of the scatterplots, however, revealed 
that a quadratic model could give a better fit to the data. And, indeed, upon analysis, we found that 
the goodness of fit improved with a quadratic solution. This was most noticeable for the relationship 
between Performance IQ and total belief scores; the R2 value increased from .02 to .10. Similarly, 
trend analysis revealed a quadratic trend (p < .05) but no linear trend for Performance IQ relative to 
total beliefs. What was happening was that lower IQ scores were associated with moderately 
transcendent beliefs; somewhat midrange IQ scores were related to more materialist beliefs; while 
higher IQ scores corresponded to highly transcendent beliefs. What this suggests is that transcendent 
beliefs could be held for different reasons; in some cases, perhaps because one does not know better, 
and in other cases, perhaps because one does know better. 
Some insight for the correspondence between Performance IQ and transcendent beliefs is 
given by the changes in scores on Object Assembly, one of the subscales of Performance IQ, as 
shown in Table 3. In the Object Assembly task, participants are required to identify common objects, 
such as a farm tractor, from scrambled slices of their silhouettes. Those who are better able to 
mentally synthesize visual fragments into a whole picture are more likely to believe that there is 
more to reality than that which meets the eye. Given that materialism can be construed as a simplistic 
schema for organizing one=s experience, it could be that those who view the world as being more 
complex by including meaning as an ontologically primitive element are those who have a greater 
capacity to integrate disparate features of their experience. While it need not be that the cognitive 
skills necessary for such holistic thinking are necessarily the same as those used for the Object 
Assembly task, the results are nonetheless suggestive (Lukey & Barušs, 2005). 
 
 Resolution 
It is fairly clear from the foregoing analysis that differences in beliefs about consciousness 
and reality are a source of confusion in consciousness studies. What, if anything, can be done about 
the situation? The tendency, as I have observed it, has simply been to ignore the positions that do not 
coincide with one=s own. So, for example, for a materialist, conservatively and extraordinarily 
transcendent beliefs are simply silly, possibly pathological, but ontologically fictional, so there is 
really nothing that needs to be done beyond preventing anyone holding those positions from 
participating in the scientific study of consciousness. Is this the best that can be done? 
Perhaps. Beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality are held with a great deal of 
conviction and are not about to be easily dislodged. Thus, the consciousness studies community 
might necessarily be destined to remain fragmented, with researchers gravitating toward those who 
share their fundamental beliefs. However, a few additional comments might be helpful. 
The first is that some versions of materialism are incorrect on the basis of their own criteria 
(Barušs, 1993; 2007). Materialism that is based on the schema that the physical world is made up of 
analogues of billiard balls that collide with one another with predictable trajectories does not match 
what is known empirically about the nature of matter. For instance, elementary particles have no 
finite extension in space, the notion of distance loses its meaning inside the Planck length, and, by 
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the Unruh effect, accelerating observers in a vacuum would see particles. Scale modelling fails when 
considering the nature and behaviour of subatomic events (cf. Bransden & Joachain, 1989/2000; 
Kempf, 2008; Mukhanov & Winitzki, 2007; Sudbery, 1986; Zee, 2003).Thus the nature of matter 
does not correspond to our naive intuitions about what it should be like. 
We could adopt a physicalist position and maintain that the universe is nonetheless physical 
no matter how weird it might turn out to be. However, the weirdness starts to encroach on 
transcendent versions of reality as illustrated by the quotation: AThe universe can be best pictured, 
although still very imperfectly and inadequately, as consisting of pure thought, the thought of what, 
for want of a wider word, we must describe as a mathematical thinker@ (Jeans, 1930/1937, p. 168). 
And there are physicists who think that an ontologically independent mind can have causal effects on 
the brain (Stapp, 1993/2004; 2007; Walker, 1970; 1977; 2000) as well as those who think that 
consciousness produces physical reality (Goswami, Reed, and Goswami, 1993; Goswami, 2003). 
How far up the material-trancendent dimension the physical universe itself ends up drifting remains 
to be seen. What is clear at this point in time is that we need to radically revise our notions of what 
matter is like. 
The second comment concerns the frequent appearance of a developmental sequence from 
materialist to transcendentalist beliefs. In the 1986 study by Moore and myself, the occurrence of 
extraordinary experiences was correlated with the statement that one=s beliefs about reality had 
changed dramatically in the past (Barušs, 1990). This is consistent with accounts found in the altered 
states literature of individuals whose beliefs changed radically as a result of the occurrence of 
unusual experiences. This has been noted, in particular, for the case of near-death experiences, in 
which, some of those who have come close to death have become convinced that they have been in 
the state where death occurs and that that there is no death; that physical consciousness continues to 
exist after the physical body has died (Barušs, 2003; Greyson, 1994; 2000; Fenwick & Fenwick, 
1995). 
In less dramatic fashion, one can become convinced of the existence of transcendent aspects 
of reality upon studying the empirical data concerning anomalous events that are difficult to explain 
in physicalist terms, such as remote perception, anomalous human-machine interactions (Jahn & 
Dunne, 2005), or the occurrence of precognitive dreams (Barušs, 2007; Ullman, 1999; Ullman & 
Krippner, 1973). Of course, one would need to have overcome the confirmation bias of discounting 
information contrary to one=s own beliefs in order to seriously study such anomalous phenomena. 
But it is the extraordinarily transcendent perspective which is associated with the need for self-
development as a way of acquiring knowledge and not the materialistic one. In fact, in a survey of 
participants at the scientific meeting Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996 ‘Tucson II’, 
respondents who had indicated that they had carefully examined their fundamental beliefs about 
reality scored significantly higher on all of the belief scales except Extraordinary Beliefs (Barušs & 
Moore, 1998). Thus, those tending toward a materialist position are less likely to examine their own 
beliefs than those tending toward the more transcendent positions. 
Movement from materialist to transcendent beliefs is also curtailed by the institutionalization 
of materialism in the academy, so that it can be difficult to pursue academic programs, obtain tenured 
academic positions, receive research funding, publish in mainstream journals, and supervise graduate 
theses unless one subscribes to a materialist agenda. Such politics of science occur in the scientific 
community more generally (cf. Kellehear, 1996; Jahn, 2001). Moore and I were struck by the degree 
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to which participants in the 1986 study scored in the transcendent direction relative to how little such 
beliefs were reflected in the published literature. We were left with the impression that there were 
closet transcendentalists who were pretending to be materialists so as not to jeopardize their careers. 
The final comment is just that, given the nature of beliefs about consciousness and reality, 
global statements about which of the positions is correct would be unacceptable to most readers 
unless those statements coincided with their own views. So the only globally acceptable resolution is 
to recognize the need for authenticity on the part of researchers to act on the basis of their own 
understanding (cf. Barušs, 1996) and thereby, given the diversity of individual understandings, to 
acknowledge that the scientific study of consciousness will continue to go madly off in all directions. 
Thus we are left with clarity concerning some of the confusion regarding the study of consciousness 
but not the elimination of the source of the confusion. Consciousness studies will continue to be a 
fragmented enterprise. 
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